The 1973 war :- Yom Kippur war - October war
Shortly after midnight on October 5, 1973, the telephone rang in the London home of Dubi Asherov, an Israeli case officer handling an Egyptian spy referred to as ‘The Source’. It was ‘The Source’ and his message was simple: “I need to meet the boss, urgently.”
Asherov called Tel Aviv to wake his superior, Zvi Zamir, the director of Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad. Within just a few hours, Zamir was on his way to the British capital, where he met ‘The Source’ in a Mossad safe house. The information he heard there was astonishing – but what made it all the more important was the identity of the man delivering it.
“Ashraf Marwan was one of the best spies in espionage history,” explains Ahron Bregman from the department of war studies at King’s College, London. “He was the perfect spy. He was not only clever and very, very efficient but he was also very close to the information. He was a relative of [Gamal Abdul] Nasser [the Egyptian president from 1956 until 1970] and he was the right hand man of President [Anwar] Sadat [who ruled Egypt from 1970 until 1981].”
So, when Marwan told Zamir that the following day at 6pm Egypt and Syria would launch an attack on Israel, there was every reason to believe him. But was this a genuine leak from the very centre of Egyptian power or was ‘The Source’ delivering information that was designed to deceive?
On the morning of October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the Israeli cabinet met in an emergency session. It decided on the immediate mobilisation of reservists and devised a defence plan, codenamed ‘Dovecote’, which would be triggered two hours before the start of the battle.
At 2pm, 6,220 Egyptian air force jets crossed the Suez Canal, heading for Sinai, while Syrian jets simultaneously began a massive aerial strike on Israeli positions in the Golan Heights.
The two countries had launched an all-out war against Israel – and they had done it four hours earlier than ‘The Source’ had led the Israelis to believe they would. Their aim: to liberate the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights - territories occupied by Israel six years earlier during the Six Day War.
Despite earlier intelligence warnings of an upcoming Arab attack, the head of Aman, Israel’s military intelligence, General Eli Zeira, was convinced there was nothing to worry about. As a result, Israel was completely unprepared. Its regular army was outnumbered and its reservists were not yet in place.
While Sadat’s close relationship with the Soviets guaranteed a supply of military hardware, the Israelis knew that he had been unable to obtain the latest generation of attack weapons and that without them their military might outweighed that of Egypt.
But, ever since the humiliation of the Six Day War, Egyptians had longed to see their country fight back. “There was a devastating feeling of crisis and defeat then,” explains Egyptian author and journalist Gamal El-Ghitani.
And while the Egyptian people agitated for war, the most powerful constituency of all, Egypt’s army, was also desperate to show that it could take on – and defeat – the enemy it faced across the Suez Canal every day.
A point to prove
Aware that his country’s weapons were dated and that it lacked the ability to liberate the Sinai in its entirety in a military operation, just four months after taking power, Sadat had offered the Israelis a peace deal if they would withdraw from Sinai. Golda Meir, the then Israeli prime minister, rebuffed the offer.
So, left to contemplate a war, Sadat found an ally. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had come to power through a coup d’etat in 1970, and he too had a point to prove to his people.
Hisham Jaber, the director of the Middle East Studies Centre in Beirut, explains: “Hafez al-Assad was the defence minister during the 1967 defeat, and was held mainly accountable …. So, since al-Assad came to power in Syria, he started to absolve himself of the 1967 defeat, and to prepare the Syrian army for the next battle.”
In a series of meetings throughout 1973, Sadat and Assad refined their war plan, giving it the codename ‘Badr’ after the Prophet Mohammed’s first victorious battle.
Crossing the Suez Canal
Syria began concentrating its troops in the Golan, while Egypt did the same on the Suez Canal. But, having responded to a similar build-up five months earlier only to find that the Egyptians had gone no further than the edge of the Canal, Israeli military intelligence was determined not to make the same costly mistake.
“In a document that Aman published at noon … [on] October 5, it was a perfect description of the Egyptian army [getting] ready to go to war,” says Israeli military historian Uri Bar-Joseph. “The bottom line was we nevertheless believed that there was no change in the Egyptian estimate regarding the balance of forces with the IDF, and therefore the likelihood for war is low.”
Within minutes of the first aerial attacks, a massive artillery barrage began. Under the cover of artillery fire, the first wave of Egyptian ground troops crossed the Canal – 4,000 men in 720 rafts. With the war already half an hour old, ‘Dovecote’ was rushed into action. But, by 5pm, 45 Egyptian infantry battalions had crossed the Canal. ‘Dovecote’ had failed.
By sunrise on day two, the war appeared to have been an unequivocal success for Egypt’s armed forces; 100,000 men, more than 1,000 tanks and over 10,000 other vehicles had crossed the Suez Canal with only minimal losses.
An advantage lost
On the Golan front, three Syrian infantry divisions crossed the 1967 ceasefire line known as the Purple Line. And, two hours into the war, the Syrians gained their first significant victory when they captured ‘Israel’s Eye’ – a key Israeli vantage point 2,000m above sea level on top of Mount Hermon.
The Syrians were overtaken by enthusiasm during the first two days, thinking they can overpower Israel.
Hisham Jaber, the director of the Middle East Studies Centre in Beirut
By nightfall on October 6, pushing through unguarded holes in the Israeli line, Syrian tanks entered central Golan. But by midnight, with the Syrians having made major gains, the order came to stop the advance and to regroup for another assault in the morning.
Before them, the roads stretching down to the Jordan Valley and the heart of Israel lay undefended. Just a few kilometres to the east, on the edge of the Golan, were positions which, had they been taken, would have been virtually impregnable. But al-Assad controlled the Syrian army with an iron grip and no one was allowed to deviate from his original plan.
Within hours, almost a quarter of a million Israeli reservists were mobilised. The Syrians had calculated that it would take the Israeli reserves 24 hours to reach Golan. But, the first tanks were there by midnight - just 15 hours after they had been mobilised.
Shortly after dawn, ignoring the fact that the Israelis had successfully mobilised to meet them, the Syrians launched their planned tank assault. Their main target was Nafakh, the Israeli advanced command centre and the strategic crossroads that controls the Golan. The Israeli forces managed to stop the Syrians but paid a high price in soldiers and tanks.
By the end of day four, in a place in northern Golan that became known as the ‘Valley of Tears’, the Israelis had destroyed hundreds of Syrian tanks.
“The Syrians were overtaken by enthusiasm during the first two days, thinking they can overpower Israel. That means taking over the Golan, and approaching occupied Palestine. They thought they could end the war,” explains Jaber. “But they overstretched themselves, and suffered huge losses of tanks during those first three days.”
On the defensive
In Sinai, however, the Egyptians had used their success on day one to secure defensive bridgeheads, and were subsequently prepared for the inevitable Israeli counterattack when it began on October 8.
Yosri Omara from the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division recalls: “We received orders to fire. We fired at them with every weapon we had …. It was a massacre … in the true meaning of the word …. The Egyptian RPG soldiers were moving like birds, like birds jumping from one tree to another. They would hide behind a ramp till the tank was 50m away and within range, then they fired at it. They would knock that one out then move on to the next tank.”
For the first time in its 25-year history, Israel was on the defensive. And, as the first week of the conflict concluded, it suffered another serious blow. On October 13, in front of the world’s media, the last of Israel’s Bar-Lev line of fortresses along the eastern coast of the Suez Canal surrendered to the 43rd battalion of Egyptian commandos.
“I couldn’t believe my eyes, seeing the Israeli soldiers waving the white flag, and humiliated,” says Hamdy El-Shorbagy from the Egyptian 43rd Commando Battalion.
The streets of Cairo filled with Egyptians reveling in their military’s triumphs and the first liberation of land occupied by Israel in the Six Day War provoked an enthusiastic response across the Arab world.
But in less than 24 hours, Israel had mobilised two armoured divisions, which soon turned the Syrian advance into a retreat. The Israelis advanced, capturing territory deep inside Syria.
Two different wars
Eight months earlier Sadat and Assad had forged the plan to launch a war against Israel on two fronts. But it now seemed that the two presidents had entirely different concepts of the war they had planned together.
“Assad told me that from the moment of his seizure of power, his ambition, his dream, was to avenge the defeat of 1967 when Syria had lost the Golan to Israel and when Assad himself was the defence minister,” says Patrick Seale, a British journalist and Hafez al-Assad biographer. “So I think he felt it as a personal responsibility for the recovery of the land. Assad saw the war, which he was planning, as a war of liberation.”
Sadat, on the other hand, had sought a limited war to focus the minds of the world’s superpowers, and to jump-start the stalled peace process.
A week into it, Sadat’s personal target had already been surpassed, and a swift victory appeared to be in sight. So when, on October 13, the British ambassador to Egypt delivered an offer to broker a UN ceasefire resolution, which he said the Israelis were prepared to accept based on the current positions, seduced by success, Sadat refused. He would, he stated, only accept a ceasefire if Israel withdrew from the whole of Sinai.
“Things were going very well for Sadat,” explains Abraham Rabinovich, the author of The Yom Kippur War. “He didn’t want to stop the war. Something dramatic had to be done to persuade him to agree to a ceasefire; maybe even to get him to request a ceasefire, and the only thing that could work was [the] crossing of the Canal. That might scare him enough.”
On the morning of October 14, the Egyptian armour moved east. But the Israelis were waiting in pre-prepared positions and, within the first few minutes of battle, the Egyptians suffered significant casualties. By midday, 250 tanks had been lost and the Egyptian general command ordered all advancing forces to retreat.
On the Syrian front, the Israelis had suffered heavy losses, but achieved significant gains - advancing to within 35km of Damascus, and occupying new territories to bring to the bargaining table. They were now able to turn their attention south to the Egyptians. The plan to cross the Suez Canal had been finalised and given the name ‘Stouthearted Men’. But first they would have to take on the southern flank of the Egyptian 2nd army, which stood in the way of an Israeli advance.
The Battle of Chinese Farm
The ensuing fight would centre around an Egyptian agricultural development on which work had begun in the early 1960s with the help of Japanese experts. When they had occupied the area during the Six Day War, the Israelis had mistaken the Japanese writing on irrigation equipment for Chinese. The farm had now been recaptured by the Egyptians but at dusk on October 15, Israeli tanks started their assault on the ‘Chinese Farm’.
By the morning of October 16, 15 rafts had reached the Canal and begun ferrying Israeli tanks to the west. The crossing went almost unnoticed by the Egyptians and, later that same morning, in his first public appearance since the war started, Sadat led a victory parade through the streets of Cairo.
Egyptian reports about the Israeli crossing were confusing and underestimated the scale of the problem. It was only when the Israeli forces in the west went on the offensive that the Egyptians realised their enemy was already in their backyard.
The Egyptians suffered heavy losses. After two days of heavy fighting over the Chinese Farm, the remnants of the brigade that had blocked the road to the Canal retreated - but only after making the Israelis pay a steep price.
“Yes, [it was a] painful victory, very painful, mainly because of the dead and the wounded,” remembers Uri Dan, an Israeli war correspondent. “In one night of the crossing of the Canal, we lost some 400 people. Tanks were fighting, some of them we saw in broad daylight later, one barrel against another, like two sword combatants in medieval time[s]. But, here they were tanks, both of them destroyed, maybe most of the people in … them dead. The valley of death next day, along the Canal was terrible, but we were on the other side of the Canal.”
On October 18, the Israeli high command decided to capitalise on the successful crossing, building their presence on the western bank of the Canal to three armoured divisions. One division would move north to surround the Egyptian 2nd army and capture the city of Ismailia. The other two divisions would move south to encircle the Egyptian 3rd army and capture the city of Suez.
Soon after, Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador to Egypt and told him that he was ready to accept a ceasefire. This time, however, it was the Israelis who had no interest.
“We can say that Israel had a greater interest in the ceasefire not kicking in right at that moment because it still had work to do – still territory it wants to capture,” explains Rabinovich.
Two weeks into the war, and with the opposing forces locked in a stalemate, Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, arrived in Moscow. His goal was to agree a UN ceasefire acceptable to Egypt’s Soviet allies.
On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire. The fighting was due to stop at 6.52pm Middle Eastern time. But as morning broke on October 23, Israelis forces went into action as normal. By the end of the day they had bypassed Suez City and reached the port of Adabia.
The Egyptian 3rd army, dug in on the eastern side of the Canal, was surrounded by Israeli troops on every side – 35,000 men were cut off from their bases.
On October 23, the Security Council reconvened to confirm the ceasefire - issuing Resolution 339 and directing that UN observers be dispatched to the front. This new ceasefire was scheduled to go into effect at 7am the following day. But, once again, Israel broke it.
“Their main target was a big city, the conquering of a big city, either Ismailia or Suez. A city with a big name,” explains El-Ghitani. “They were fighting more of a media battle, but at the same time, they wanted to achieve a bigger political goal.”
The battle for Suez
Until the Six Day War, Suez was a flourishing industrial city and port. But after 1967, the city found itself on the frontline between Egypt and Israeli-occupied Sinai. A target for Israeli attacks, it was soon reduced to rubble. A quarter of a million people were evacuated leaving the city virtually abandoned. Just 5,000 people remained to manage the infrastructure and man the remaining factories.
Early on October 24, just as the new ceasefire was scheduled to start, Israeli tanks and troops moved into the semi-deserted city. But they soon encountered resistance from a small militia. By the time they were driven from the city, 80 Israeli soldiers were dead and 120 wounded.
On the same day, an alarming message reached Washington: the Soviets were considering taking unilateral action to impose the ceasefire. With Richard Nixon, the US president, submerged in the ‘Watergate Scandal’, it was left to Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, to handle the crisis. He decided to respond to the Soviet threat with a show of force. The US armed forces state of alert was raised to the highest level in peacetime.
Walter J Boyne, the author of The Two O'Clock War says: “The question of the US versus [the] Soviet Union always boils down to mutual annihilation: we could’ve killed everybody in the Soviet Union, they could’ve killed everybody in the US, and the rest of the world would’ve gone. It was an absolutely insane situation. The thing that saved it was that each side knew that if a war occurred the leaders themselves would get killed. So when you know you are going to get killed in a war, not just some poor peasant soldier is going to get killed, you make different decisions about starting a war.”
The next day, diplomacy prevailed, the Soviets stepped back and the alert was defused. But for a full 24 hours, the world had stood on the brink of a war between two nuclear superpowers.
Meanwhile, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 340 – its third in less than four days.
Fighting on alone
As the balance shifted in favour of Israel, other Arab countries sent troops in support of Syria and Egypt. The Syrian front was strengthened by the arrival of expeditionary forces from Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The plan was to use this cocktail of Arab forces to drive the Israelis out of the pocket they had occupied in the Syrian mainland.
The date of the attack was set for October 23. But it would never happen, because Egypt’s Sadat had accepted a UN ceasefire that would take effect that evening.
Al-Assad now faced the prospect of fighting on alone, so the Syrians, too, bowed to the inevitable.
But one major open sore remained for Tel Aviv. The Israeli listening post on top of Mount Hermon had been captured by Syrian paratroopers on the first day of war. With Israel now in the ascendant, on October 23, the Golani Brigade attacked. They suffered heavy losses but secured their prize.
I definitely don’t think that there are any winners in war. There'll be someone who loses more, someone who loses less, but there are no winners in wars, and that’s something which has stayed with me since 1973.
Yoram Dori, 600th Israeli Reserve Armoured Brigade
On the Suez front, 35,000 Egyptian troops remained in a perilous position, cut off from their supply line. But the Israelis were also facing a major problem. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt was holding a large number of Israeli prisoners of war - 230 in total.
In Israel, demonstrators took to the streets, accusing Golda Meir’s government of not doing enough to bring the captured soldiers home.
On October 28, Israeli and Egyptian military leaders met to negotiate a ceasefire. It was the first meeting between military representatives of the two countries in 25 years. But the negotiations quickly became strained as skirmishes continued in the confusion of the battlefield.
Meanwhile the effects of this war began to be felt globally. Arab oil-producing countries had formulated a plan to use the price of oil to pressure Western supporters of Israel. By mid-October several of the biggest producers had unilaterally raised prices by nearly 20 percent.
On Tuesday, November 6, Kissinger, flew in to Cairo for his first ever meeting with Sadat. Four days later, an initial agreement was signed guaranteeing daily convoys of non-military supplies to the city of Suez and the besieged Egyptian 3rd army.
Four days later, prisoners from both sides were exchanged.
As the New Year arrived, Kissinger returned to the region to hammer out the next step in his grand plan for Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. On January 11, 1974, he arrived in the southern Egyptian city of Aswan to meet Sadat. The next day, he left for Tel Aviv. Both sides accepted a disengagement agreement and a new term had entered the lexicon of international politics – shuttle diplomacy.
On January 18, 1974, General Mohamed El-Gamassy, the Egyptian chief of staff, and General David Elazar, his Israeli counterpart, signed an agreement that was the first in a chain that would lead to total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982.
“The greatness of that war, the October war, was that it had [an] impact not only on the political, military and security level, but on the Israeli citizen himself, in accepting the idea that I can leave the land I occupy to feel more secure,” says Mansour Abdul Wahab, an Egyptian political analyst.
But as Israel’s troops celebrated their withdrawal, the mood back home was different.
“Israel lost 2,600 men – killed. Per capita, this is three times the death rate of the Americans in Vietnam over 10 years. This Israel suffered in three weeks,” explains Rabinovich.
A Commission of Investigation headed by the president of the Israeli Supreme Court placed the blame firmly on Israel’s military. It cleared Meir and Moshe Dayan, the country’s defence minister, but the Israeli public was not appeased. Demonstrations broke out and, nine days after the commission published its report, Meir resigned.
Meanwhile, the Israelis were still occupying a salient deep inside Syria, not far from the capital Damascus. So, in May 1974, Kissinger set out on his second round of shuttle diplomacy, this time between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
After almost a month of hard talking, the US secretary of state managed to secure a second breakthrough in the region when, on May 28, Israel approved a disengagement agreement with Syria. It was signed in Geneva on June 5, bringing the War in October to an official end after 243 days of fighting.
Yoram Dori from the 600th Israeli Reserve Armoured Brigade says: “I definitely don’t think that there are any winners in war. There’ll be someone who loses more, someone who loses less, but there are no winners in wars, and that’s something which has stayed with me since 1973.”
This is the fourth Arab-Israeli round , The Arabs call it "The October war" , while the Israelis call it "The yom kippur war"
This phase began with an Egyptian Air strike on the Israeli targets in Sinai , 440 Egyptian Plane Shared in this attack , This strike achieved a great success , Some Egyptian Pilots made Human missiles of themselves They crashed with their planes onto their targets to be Sure of complete destruction of it , 95% of the Israeli targets were destroyed , while the Egyptian planes suffered just 2% losses .
At 02:00 pm the 6th of October Egypt launched her forces alive , tens of thousands of Egyptians troops crossed the Suez Canal , attacking the Bar-leve line , In just 6 Hours all The Israeli lines of forces along the Canal collapsed ,The success of the air strike was the main reason that made all the Egyptian forces repeat the success . Firing using the artillery followed the air strike . in this operation more than 2 thousands distilleries launched thousand tons of ammunition in 53 minutes were the time planned for the first 5 division of infantry to cross the Suez canal ,and They successfully crossed .
Crossing the canal itself is a complete Miracle, at least we have to remember what the Israeli Defense minister Moshe Dayan saied many times in the American press, he said " If the Egyptian tryed to cross the Canal, the color of the Canal's water will turn into red ,which is the Egyptian blood " He also expected that the Egyptians will capture the Bar-leve line at least in complete 14 Days of fighting ( But the Egyptians captured it in just 6 Hours !)
The Egyptian forces controlled the general situation in the theater of operation as well as the Suez canal . furthermore , the Egyptians caused great losses in the Israeli side and controlled navigation in the Red sea .
At the same time , the attack on all the Israeli fortifies out posts turned out isolated . On the other hand , The Egyptian aircraft and artillery targeted the close Israeli reserves ,in less than an hour Egypt had had 14,000 man crossed the Canal .
That great surprise unbalanced the Israelis ,But The Israeli aircraft began to interfere in the battle at 2:40 in an attempt to prevent the Egyptian forces from crossing the Suez Canal . the Egyptian missile umbrella resisted the Israeli aircraft and demolished the theory of the Israeli long arm for the first time since the state of Israel has been established in 1948 . with the last light of October 6th 1973 at the same time when the Israeli aircraft began to fly , The Egyptians Began to establish the bridges, As a result The Egyptian Tank began to move from the western bank to the eastern bank this move was in order to support the infantry in comforting Their enemy
The Israeli Counter attacks:- the first Israeli counter attack was on 02:45 , it was a pleasent surprise to the Egyptians , But a Bad one to The Israelis resulted That the Israeli commander lost 40 tanks in that Battle and was obliged to retreat to the east .
in another place ,after more than 2000 kilometers ,the Egyptian submarines and destroyers were controlling the straits of Bab El-Mandeb in the southern part of the Red Sea in order to complete the naval blockade around Israel .
In the morning of the October 7th almost all the Egyptian forces were on the Eastern side of The Suez Canal , in That day the Egyptians seizured their first strategic Targets in Sinai , El-Kantara east . The Israeli side was completely confident that the Egyptians will never come close to that town . the reason of their confident was that the Israelis surrounded this town by well fortified strongholds ;as this town is the key of the northern axis in Sinai .
Thn Israel mobilized 3 armored troops in Sinai so as tor retrieve the previous situation , Their First attack was on the 8th of October , At least half of the Israeli tanks were destroyed , so General Avraham Adan rescued the rest when he gave his orders of withdrawing away from the Egyptian forces , It's mentioned that he screamed "They are not the Egyptians of 1967 , did the Egyptian changed to that extent
This Day was called in Israel "The sad Monday" The Israeli Defense minister was frustrated and held a press conference ,in which he said "the situation on the Egyptian front is very Difficult"
Moreover Golda Mier , the Israeli prime minister cried while speaking on phone to Mr. Kissinger screaming "save Israel"
On October 9th , General Ariel Sharon tried to achieve what General Adan could not the day before He insisted on penetrating the defenses to reach the western side of the Canal .Therefore, he made twelve attacks that resulted in 112 of his tanks being destroyed . Finally , General Sharon admitted his failure , it's mentioned that he said "We cannot stop the Egyptians , we cannot stop them "
The 10th of October was a crucial day when the third defeat of the Israeli operational reserve took place . General Goneon , the commander of the southern command tried to show his potentials in the light of the subsequent Egyptian victories . His attempt was through an attack on the Egyptian forces after Golda Mier appointed some new commanders , this attack was launched along the front , failed too , Thus Israel found itself obliged to change it's strategy on the southern front on Sinai .
The USA Protects Israel :- The USA established an air-lift to save Israel, it was the Heaviest air-lift since the WW2, supplying Israel with new weapons of 4.9 Billion Dollars , included 56,000 tons carried on Israeli and American air-crafts , in addition to 33,000 tons through the Naval bridge .
after this moment The Israeli tanks Became out number , 10:1 , Israel began to balance itself and crossed the Canal from the Devresoir Gap , trying to siege the Egyptian third army .
The Israelis suffered losses in this phase much more the beginning , and they failed to siee the Egyptian third army , so they found no choice but to beg for a cease fire , so the war ended .
Lets ask ourselves Did Israel won in 1973 ? well , the results of the war prove this is wrong .
The End Results of october war 1973:-
1-Golda Mier resigned from her duties.
2-Moshe dian left his position too.
3-Most of the israeli generals and mosad got their rank badges torn off.
4-Israel accepted peace treaty that they refused in 1971 , only accepted it after the war .
5-Egypt got back sinai to the last inch .
on the other hand the other Question here is : did the Israeli forces achieve any victory in the operation of "the Gap" ? The facts indicate that the opposite is completely true . many defects appeared when the Israeli forces faced the Egyptian forces . some of these defects are the following:
1-The time frame of the operation : it was planned that the town of Suez would be occupied on October 18th , But Facts showed that the first Israeli attack on the city was on October 24th , and ended with an absolute Failure .
2-The strategic side : time is an important factor for Israel . the mobilization represented about 20% of the workforce in that country . the interstice was the reason for the prolonging of the time frame of the operation to 4 months . Therefor ,the life itself in Israel was affected and this was one of the Egyptian aims of operation .
3-The aim of that operation was to destroy the Egyptian forces or to compel these forces to withdraw to the west , actually this did not happen either as the Egyptian Command hurried regaining Balance through strategic reserves .
4-The siege of strategic targets : Israel aimed in that operation at seizing strategic targets in order to use that in publicity. But even this goal was not reached as a result , The Israeli prime minister had to stand in a deserted village so as to give an example that she seized a town on the western side . Consequently , this led to loosing her credibility .
5-The high Israeli losses ratio : there is nothing to be mentioned here better than an extract of what Moshe Dayan , The Israeli Defense Minister , said in the evaluation of interstice operation He said " The third act in the Israeli plan was to cross the canal to the west side and controe the line of Ismailia/Ataka mountain . Much Israeli blood was shed in these operations, but this the law of war . Israel lost 2700 persons , which is very expensive as it lost one of each thousand of it's population. this itself is painful "
Here are some pictures about the war